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Summary findings
In recent decades, a majority of countries have  They find e  vidence that certain crisis management
experienced a systemic banking crisis requiring a major-  strategies appear to add greatly to fiscal costs: unlimited
and expensive-overhaul  of their banking system. Not  deposit guarantees, open-ended liquidity support,
only do banking crises hit the budget with outlays that  repeated recapitalization, debtor bail-outs, and
must be absorbed by higher taxes (or spending cuts), but  regulatory forbearance.
they are costly in terms of forgone economic output.  Their findinigs  clearly tilt the balanice  in favor of a strict
,Many  different policy recommendations have been  rather than an accommodating approach to crisis
inade for limiting the cost of crises, but there has been  resolution. At the very least, regulatory authorities who
little systematic effort to see which recommendations  choose an accornmodating or gradualist approach to an
work in practice. Honohan and Klingebiel try to quantify  emerging crisis must be sure they have some other way to
the extent to which fiscal outlays incurred in resolving  control risk-taking.
banking distress can be attributed to crisis management
nmeasures  of a particular kind adopted by the government
in the early years of the crisis.
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In  recent  decades,  a  majority  of  countries-rich  and  poor  alike-have
experienced a systemic banking crisi,  requiring a major-and  expensive-overhaul  of
their banking system.  Not only do ba iking crises hit the budget with outlays that have to
be  absorbed by higher taxation (or spending cuts), but they are also costly in terms of
foregone economic output.
Many different policy recomnrnendations  have been made for limiting the cost of
crises; but there has been little systematic effort to see whether these recommendations
work in practice. This paper attempts -o bridge that gap. Specifically, we seek to quantify
the extent to which fiscal outlays incurred in resolving banking system distress can be
attributed to crisis management measures of a particular kind adopted by the government
during the early years of the crisis. We do this by analyzing forty crises around the world
for which we have data. This data includes information on costs and on the nature of the
resolution and intervention policy.
We  find  that  fiscal  costs  awe systematically  associated  with  a  set  of  crisis
management strategies. Our empirical findings reveal that unlimited deposit guarantees,
open-ended liquidity support, repeated recapitalizations, debtor bail-outs  and regulatory
forbearance  add  significantly  and  sizably  to  costs.  Using  the  regression  results  to
simulate the effects of these policies, we find that if countries had not extended unlimited
deposit guarantees, open-ended liquidtity  support, repeated recapitalizations, debtor bail-
outs  and regulatory  forbearance,  ave,rage fiscal  costs in  our  sample  could have  been
limited to  about  1 per  cent of  GDI'  - little more  than a  tenth  of what  was actually
experienced.  On the other hand, policy could have been worse: had countries engaged in
all of the above policies the regressicn results imply that fiscal costs in excess of 60 per
cent of GDP would have been the result.
Our model takes careful account of the independent role of macro shocks both in
contributing to  and in revealing bank insolvency, and of the fact that a bad resolution
strategy can be more damaging when the origins of the crisis are chiefly microeconomic
in nature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the nature
and extent of banking crises costs. Section III discusses the alternative crisis resolution
tools  highlighting the  choice  between  strict  and  accommodating policy.  Section IV
presents our empirical evidence measuring the extent to which  costs are influenced by
these policy choices.  Section V conc  [udes.
2II.  The costs of banking crises
No type of country has been free of  costly banking crises  in the  last quarter
century.  The  prevalence  of  banking  system  failures has  been  at  least  as  great  in
developing  and  transition  countries  as  in  the industrial  world.  By  one  count,  112
episodes of systemic banking crises occurred in 93 countries since the late 1970s and 51
borderline crises were recorded in 46 countries (Caprio, Klingebiel 1999).
Governments and, thus ultimately taxpayers, have largely  shouldered the direct
costs of banking system collapses.  These costs have been large: in  our sample of 40
countries governments spent on average 12.8 percent of national GDP to clean up their
financial  systems  (Figure  1  shows  some  of  the  higher  costs  in  our  sample).  The
percentage was even higher (14.3) in developing countries.  Some crises have led to
much larger outlays: governments spent as much as 40-55 per cent of GDP in the early
1980s crises in Argentina and Chile.  A substantial part of the costs of the recent East
Asian crisis - now projected in the region of 20-55 per cent of GDP for the three worst-
affected countries  - will  ultimately fall  on  the  budget.  Despite  the  fact  that their
economies are small, developing economies as a group have suffered cumulative fiscal
costs in excess of $1 trillion.  Among industrialized countries, Japan's  long- and drawn
out banking crisis  has been the costliest; to  date, the Japanese authorities have  spent
around 20 percent of GDP to restructure the system.
Fiscal outlays are not the only dimension in which banking collapses impose costs
on the economy.  Indeed, to the extent that bailing-out depositors amounts to a transfer
from  taxpayers to  depositors,  this  is  not  a  net  economic cost  at all.  But,  when  a
government makes the bank's claimants whole, its net costs tend to be correlated with the
true economic costs.  For one thing, the deficiency to be covered reflects the prior waste
of  investible  resources  from  bad  loan  decisions.  Furthermore,  the  assumption  by
government of large and unforeseen bail-out costs can destabilize the fiscal accounts,
triggering  high inflation  and currency  collapse  -- costly  in themselves  -- as well  as adding
to the deadweight cost of taxation.
Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that fiscal costs do not include costs borne by
depositors and other creditors of failed banks (in some cases) and also do not take into
account that part of the burden borne by depositors and borrowers in the form of widened
spreads for bad  loans that were left on banks'  balance sheets.  Moreover, they do not
reflect costs that arise from granting borrowers some monopoly privilege or other means
to improve their profits and thereby repay their loans. And finally, these estimates do not
capture the slowdown in economic activity when resources are driven out of the formal
financial sector (and into less efficient uses) and stabilization programs are derailed.
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4III.  Alternative Strategies for Managing Crises
Although all banking systems are subject to ongoing  supervision, awareness of
emerging problems of  solvency typically triggers an intensified  management  process.
Starting with a diagnosis of the scope of the crisis, notably as to whether or not it should
be considered of systemic proportions, the authorities pass through a decision-tree which
terminates  with  actions  such  as  closures  of  financial  institutions,  nationalization,
liquidation, disposition of assets, etc.  A range of possible policy responses to distress in
the banking  system  exists,  and  the  appropriate  decision will  depend  on  difficult-to-
summarize factors such as what the causes of the crisis are, what other initial conditions
prevail and political constraints facing the regulatory authorities.
It  is convenient to  distinguish between policies  for the short-term containment
phase  while the  crisis  is  still unfolding,  and those  needed  for the  rehabilitation and
restructuring phase.  In each case we can characterize the policy choice as being between
a strict and a more accommodating or gradualist stance.  In general, the strict policies
emphasize decisive, not to  say abrupt, preventive  action: a gradualist position  can be
defended in circumstances where the authorities have other ways of limiting further risk-
taking.
Containment Phase
In the early stages of any financial crisis when the crisis  is still unfolding, the
government typically implements a number of policy measures aimed at restoring public
confidence in the banking system to minimize repercussions on the real sector. As they
struggle to  contain  the  crisis,  governments are  faced with  at least  two  key  strategic
questions:
(i)  Should  open-ended  liquidity  support be  extended  to  all  financial  institutions
including insolvent ones?
(ii)  Do governments need to provide generalizes government guarantees to depositors
and creditors of financial institutions (in times of severe disruption) to stem a loss
of confidence in the system as a whole?
Liquidity  support. The classic doctrine is that the central banks  should abstain
from providing open-ended emergency liquidity support to a bank unless it is satisfied
that the bank is viable and oversight is adequate. Proponents of this view observe that
liquidity support has often been used by governments to delay crisis recognition and to
avoid intervening in de facto already failed institutions, and they argue that open-ended
liquidity  support  is  doomed  to  fail  because  managerial  and  shareholder  incentives
suddenly shift for a financial institution when it becomes insolvent. As  against this, an
alternative view recognizes that crisis conditions make it all but impossible to distinguish
between solvent and insolvent institutions, and argues that a generalized crisis leaves the
authorities with little option but to extend liquidity support.
5Blanket guarantees. A second contentious point is whether governments should or
should not extend explicit generalized guarantees to depositors and creditors, to stem the
loss of confidence in the financial system.  Some take a strict line here too, arguing that
guarantees, if they are credible, reduce large creditors'  incentives to monitor financial
institutions, thereby providing ready funds to managers and shareholders to be used in
"gambling to  resurrect"  their  insolv-nt banks.  They further point  out  that  extensive
guarantees also limit the governments' maneuverability in terms of how to allocate losses
in the future, with the result that they may end up carrying most of the cost on the budget.
Others reason that, by extending a timely and temporary guarantee, the authorities can
avoid the much greater fiscal and economic costs that can result from a widespread panic,
such as can be triggered or exacerbated by the closure of a few banks.
The Medium-Term Rehabilitation and Restructuring Phase
During  the rehabilitation  ancL  restructuring phase,  the  authorities'  focus is  to
restore the capital position of banking institutions and to resolve bad assets. In this phase,
key strategic questions facing the autLorities include the following three:
(i)  Is it safe for governments to a!.low  banks to strengthen their capital base over time
through increased profits either via implicit or explicit forbearance?
(ii)  Should  the  authorities  insist  on  accomplishing  the  full  recapitalization
immediately, or can recapitalization be done in stages?
(iii)  Should  the  post-crisis  recovery  of  non-performing  bank  claims  be  centrally
managed or left to the bank?
(iv)  Should the government intervene to help borrowers meet their debts?
Forbearance. If banks still have a franchise value, they could in principle restore
their capital over time  by retaining profits.  But  such  a  "flow solution" may require
allowing banks to function while undercapitalized, and as such typically requires some
forbearance relative to strict application of prudential requirements.  On a conceptual
level  one  can  distinguish  between  three  degrees  of  forbearance.  In  the  most
accommodating form of forbearance banks that are generally known to be insolvent are
allowed to remain open. An intermediate degree of forbearance can be characterized by
governments allowing banks known to be severely undercapitalized to remain open under
existing management for an extendecL  period, e.g. more than twelve months. A somewhat
less  accommodating  forbearance  policy  can  be  characterized  either  by  temporary
relaxation of other regulations, in particular loan classification and loan loss provisioning
requirements, by the turning of a blirnd  eye to violations of laws, standards and regulation
by  either individual banks or the entire banking  system, or by hasty  line-of-business
deregulation of banking, designed to open new profit opportunities to financially weak
banks by permitting them to engage in unfamiliar business such as securities trading,
investment banking, credit card and travel services, etc.  Opponents of forbearance point
to  the apparent  contradiction involved  in relaxing  requirements just  when  they  bite.
Proponents of  forbearance policies observe that regulation should be  state-contingent,
and that relaxation in response to mazroecoinomic  downturns can provide better overall ex
ante risk sharing, as well as shelter.ng bank customers from the disruption to financial
6services (including credit crunches) that may result from widespread suspensions and
bank closures.
Repeated recapitalizations.  Instead of relying on a flow of future profits, stock
solutions  require  immediate  capital  injections,  supported  by  the  government  and
designed to restore the solvency of viable but insolvent or marginal solvent institutions
back to solvency (liquidating non-viable institutions can also be seen as a stock solution).
If such recapitalization needs to be repeated, this may be interpreted as an indication of
capital forbearance  at the earlier stage.  Opponents of  a policy  resulting  in  repeated
recapitalizations point to the moral hazard entailed, with banks'  incentives to collect on
their  loans  and  borrowers'  incentives to  repay  undermined,  as  both  await  the  next
'bailout'.  Proponents of partial (and hence repeated) recapitalizations point to the fiscal
pressures that  can result  from immediate recognition of the  full need  for additional
capital.
Asset  management  companies.  The  two  extreme  choices  for  asset  resolution
strategies  include  setting  up  a  government  agency  with  the  full  responsibility  of
acquiring, restructuring, and selling the assets-the  so-called centralized approach-or
letting banks  manage  their  own  non-performing  assets-the  so-called  decentralized
approach.  Opponents of centralized asset management companies (AMCs) argue that
such agencies face a number of obstacles to operate effectively. They maintain that it
may be difficult to insulate those entities against political pressure especially if they hold
a large portion of corporate claims. Furthermore, they point out that a transfer of loans
breaks the links between banks and corporations, links that may have positive value given
banks' privileged access to corporate information. And finally, they continue if AMCs do
not manage their assets actively, credit discipline in the whole financial system can be
undermined, increasing the overall costs of the crisis.  Proponents of centralized AMCs
observe that the centralization of assets permits a consolidation of skills and resources, as
well as easier monitoring and supervision of workout practices.  They argue that, as
claims are consolidated, more leverage will be obtained over debtors and perverse links
between  banks  and  corporations can  be  broken,  thus  allowing  better  collection  on
(connected) loans.'
Public Debt Relief Programs.  If bailouts of banks are politically unpopular, an
indirect way of relieving the crisis, and  possibly getting real  economic activity back
under way is the introduction of a public debt relief program.  Critics of this approach
argue that, in addition to obvious moral hazard, it risks being more open-ended, attracting
borrowers who would never have been able to repay even in good times, and diverting
additional investible resources to firms that should not be considered creditworthy going
forward.
For cross country experience with asset management companies see Klingebiel (2000).
7IV.  The Empirical Evidence
Having  considered  the  various  intervention  and  resolution  policy  tools  that
governments can adopt and that may influence the fiscal costs of the crisis, we now turn
to the empirical evidence. Perhaps Ihere are no unique answers to these questions: the
specific country circumstances may determine what is the correct policy choice.  But we
can look at the statistical relationship between policy choices and crisis costs. Modeling
the cross-country variation in the size of the fiscal costs requires us to take account both
of policy variables and exogenous variables.  The severity of a triggering macroeconomic
recession  and  other  factors unrelated  to  the  management  and  resolution  policy  can
obviously increase the overall insolvency independently of the policies adopted, and we
need to take account of this if we are not to risk assigning too much importance to the
role of policy.  The resolution policies can in turn deepen the losses (and their influence
will depend on the extent to which the crisis is caused by microeconomic management
deficiencies in the banks).  Finally, the government can choose to cover more or less of
the overall  losses.  These considerations  are  elaborated  on  in  Section  IV.l,  before
proceeding to describe the data in Section IV.2 and the regression results (Section IV.3).
IV.I  Modeling: methodological i5sues
We  attempt  to  model  the  cross-country variation in  actual  fiscal  costs,  as  a
function of the use of these policy tools.  There are several pitfalls in  attempting to
model the costs of crisis that make this issue more complex than may at first sight appear.
In  this  section  we  draw  attention  to  some  of  these methodological  issues. Readers
unconcerned with methodology can proceed directly to Section IV.2.
In order  to see whether there is any evidence that intervention  and resolution
policies  can lower the ultimate fiscal cost of banking crises we need  to consider the
manner in which such costs emerge ,md crystallize over time.  After all, a large fiscal cost
could reflect either sudden adverse exogenous shocks, or a slow deterioration in solvency
tolerated by a lax regulatory regime; and the fiscal cost of a given degree of insolvency
can also  depend on policy.  So while our interest is chiefly in  the role of regulatory
policy, we need to consider how to interpret data that will surely also be influenced by
these other types of factor.
A banking crisis can sometimes be dated to  a particular incident (such as the
closure of 16 banks in Indonesia in ]ate 1997). But such dramatic events rarely represent
either the beginning or the end of the process.  More typically, the underlying insolvency
has  been  evolving  over  a  lengthy  period  of  time  and  the  crisis  event  is  merely  a
denouement, the point at which the insolvency is revealed to the public.  Sometimes the
regulator will already be well-informed of conditions, sometimes not; but  even in the
latter condition,  underlying weakr.esses were  generally already  present,  even  if  not
detected. 2
2In  some instances, a solvent and sound banking system will be plunged into insolvency by an exceptional
shock  - war, say, or a devastating  natural  disaster. This  type of event  can be encompassed  by our approach
also. By definition, though, soundly-run ba  nks try to manage their affairs so as not to assume any sizable
8One way of capturing the implications of this perspective is to assume that there is
an underlying though unobserved or latent variable representing the degree of insolvency
in the banking system.  This variable evolves over time depending on external conditions,
and also  on some  internal dynamics (which need not be  explicitly modeled  here): for
example, there may also be a tendency for an insolvent system to move more rapidly into
deeper insolvency.  At some point the crisis emerges into the open, and either then or
later there is a resolution involving public fiscal outlays to meet all or part of the financial
deficiency as measured by the latent variable.
The  modeling  strategy  underlying  the  regressions  which  we  report  does  not
involve any attempt to explain whether, why or when a crisis occurs. 3 Instead, our data is
drawn from countries where some form of crisis did occur, so we can proceed on the
assumption  that  a  crisis  of  insolvency  has  occurred,  and  ask  what  difference  will
intervention and resolution policies make to the ultimate fiscal cost.
Let -zi(t) be the net worth at time t of each bank i, (i = 1 to n).  Then the gross
financial deficiency of the system at time t is the sum of each bank's  gross deficiency
(since negative net worth at one bank cannot be offset by a positive net worth at another
bank):
Z(t)  =  Xr1 max[zi (t),O]
Each z,{t) evolves over time depending on the degree of risk assumed in the portfolio and
the size of exogenous shocks. Optimal bank regulation limits fiscal exposure by insisting
on a minimum value of z,(t) conditioned on the degree of risk, and monitors compliance
periodically (Caprio and Honohan, 2000).  Ex ante the policy is one of limiting the value
of the implicit rolling put option granted by the state to  the banking  system (Merton,
1977); ex post  the fiscal costs represent the maturity value of the option.  In an ideal
world  of  accurate  measurement,  and  frequent  monitoring,  banks  that  are  unable  to
comply will be intervened promptly and the probability of fiscal costs arising will be low
and confined to instances of unusually severe shocks.  The realized fiscal costs in such
circumstances will reflect bad luck more than bad policy, and will tends to be correlated
with  measures of  adverse macroeconomic shocks.  In reality failed banks  have been
allowed to operate with low or negative values of zi for extended periods.  The delay in
starting the resolution process may itself be one of the biggest contributors to fiscal cost.
When the insolvent bank is eventually effectively intervened at time T, the net deficiency
zi(T) thus depends not only on the size of the adverse shocks it has encountered, but on
how long it has been allowed to function with low or negative values of zi and on the risk
that  was being  assumed  by  the bank,  i.e. on  the  degree  to  which  regulatory  policy
deviated from the optimum -- or in short on the value of the implicit put option.
risk  of failure. Adverse  shocks  generally  serve  to reveal what  would  have  been recognized  as insolvency  if
the bank's  portfolio  had  been  valued at (risk-adjusted)  market  value.
3The  pathbreaking  studies  of Demirgiiu-Kunt  and  Detragiache  (1998, 1999)  identify  the measurable  factors
that prove  significant  in cross-country  econometric  analysis,  and also  display  the limited  ability  of such
equations  to predict  crises  out of sample.
9The final component of the ultimate fiscal cost is the mapping from zi(7) to the
fiscal outlays.  This depends on the degree to which other claimants are made to absorb
losses and on the degree to which tLe full value of the portfolio at time T is realized by
the State.
We  can  schematically capture  the  way  in  which  the  evolution  of  the  bank's
financial deficiency z over time depends on the size of exogenous  shocks, and on the
degree to which the system is capitalized, as follows:
z(t) =AZ(t-1  ))+U(t)  (1)
where  u  is  a  zero-mean  stochastic  process  with  variance a;  J(z)/z  is  an  increasing
function, J(z)=z for large negative values of z (well-capitalized bank), f(z)>z  for positive
values of z (declining expected value of insolvent bank over time).
At some date T the system is intervened and the process (1) comes to a halt.  The
probability of intervention at time t P(z(t),R) is a function of latent variable z(t) and of the
regulatory policy  stance R.  Both f.rst derivatives of P  are positive:  a higher financial
deficiency of the banks increases the probability of intervention, as does a stricter policy
stance R.  Note that in the regressions we have data only for intervention and resolution
policy,  and  not  on  other  aspects  of  preventative  policy:  the  omission  of  variables
capturing preventative policy may tend to bias the results in the direction of exaggerating
the importance of intervention and resolution per se.
Even without knowing the  date of  intervention  T, combining  the intervention
probability with the process z allows us to deduce that the expected deficiency at the time
of  intervention E{z(T)}depends on  the  variance  of  exogenous  shocks  a  and  on  the
strictness of intervention policy R.  (iiven knowledge of T, the expected value of z(T) also
depends on the size of actual shocks observed prior to T.
Finally, the fiscal costf of thr bank failure depends on z(T), on the liberality of the
bail-out policy for claimants and on the effectiveness of asset recovery.
The degree to which we can simply aggregate this story for the system as a whole
depends on the degree to which  developments are synchronized.  Taking this to  be  a
reasonable basis for arriving at an  estimating equation, we draw  on (1) to motivate  a
corresponding equation for the evoluttion  of the aggregate indicator of insolvency Z(t):
Z(t)=flZ(t-  1))+  U()  (1')
This discussion points to threie  components of the ultimate expected fiscal cost F.
First, the scale of adverse shocks U .n the period before the date of intervention T; second
the strictness R of intervention policy (or the value of the implicit put option offered by
the regulator); third, the degree S to which the capital deficiency at the time of insolvency
maps to fiscal costs, reflecting the degree of bail-out and of asset recovery.
The estimating equation will then be of the general form
10F = F(U,R,S) + ,  (2)
where U, R and S represent sets of explanatory variables as described below, and £  is a
disturbance term.
In  addition,  we  may  have  supplementary  information  which  allows  us  to
distinguish between episodes where microeconomic bank management deficiencies were
particularly prevalent  (as distinct  from episodes where government  interference  in the
banking system was a direct cause of insolvency, or where a macroeconomic boom and
bust cycle was the dominant factor).  In the presence of microeconomic management
deficiencies, prompt intervention becomes even more important.  Also, asset recovery
may subsequently be more difficult.  Therefore, in the regressions, we also test for the
significance of slope dummies M (for the variables proxying R and S) distinguishing the
more "micro" episodes.
An  important  point  to  note  is  that  observed  policy  actions  may  be  jointly
determined by the underlying strictness of policy R and the severity of the crisis.  This
will make the observed  variables endogenous, potentially biasing the estimates unless
validly instrumented.
IV.2  Sample and variables
A  major  challenge  has  been  to  develop  an  adequate  data  set,  not  only  to
characterize the regulatory policies that were in effect, and other causal factors, but also
the actual fiscal costs, for which most data sources are not very reliable.  The sources and
methods for the data are described in the Data Appendix.
Our  sample  consists  of  34  countries  (27  of  them  developing  or  transition
economies) which have  experienced significant fiscal costs  from bank  failures during
1970-2000. This  is  the maximal  number  of  countries  for  which  we  have  sufficient
information both on fiscal costs and on regulatory practice. In six of these countries, two
distinct episodes can be identified, and these are treated separately, to give 40 distinct
country experiences.
The variable to be explained is the estimated total direct fiscal cost of the banking
crisis  as  a percentage  of  GDP. 4 The explanatory variables  can be  divided into  three
groups (fuiller  definitions are in the Data Appendix):
Crisis resolution policy  variables.  In line with the discussion of Section 11.  1, we
employed seven variables measuring resolution policy and instruments used.  These are
all dummy variables taking the value 0 when  policy was strict and  1 when the more
relaxed option was chosen.
4 The results reported  employ  the functional  forrn log y.  This was chosen to reduce the skewness  of the
dependent  variable. After the log transformnation,  the skewness  is -0.4, kurtosis  2.3, Jarque-Bera  statistic
2.0; for the untransformed  cost variable  these figures  are 1.5, 4.8 and 21.5. A drawback  of this functional
form is that it is undefined as cost goes to zero.  Alternative  functional forms  such as log (I+cost)  and
costl/ l +cost) actually gave qualitatively similar results.
11LIQSUP indicates whether er  ergency liquidity support was provided to banks. It
takes the value 1 if  govermments  extended support for longer than 12 months and the
overall support is greater than total banking capital (happened in 23 of our 40 cases).
GUAR is a dummy variable which takes on value of 1 in cases where governments
either issued an explicit guarantee cr market participants were implicitly protected from
any losses if public banks' market share exceeded 75 percent (also 23 cases).
Two measures of forbearance: FORB-A =  1 if insolvent banks were permitted to
continue functioning; FORB-B =  1 if other bank prudential regulations were suspended or
not  fully applied.  The number of cases of  forbearance in  our sample are 9  and 26
respectively.
Three other dummies: one indicating where banks were repeatedly recapitalized
REPCAP (9 cases); one indicating wh.,re governments set up centralized asset management
companies AMC  (15  cases);  finally we  included  a  dummy variable  indicating where
governments implemented an across-the-board public debt relief program PRDP (9 cases)
Table 1: Characterizing Government Responses to Banking Crisis
No of countries
Policy  Tools  implemenn_
Liquidity  Support  LIQSUP  23
Unlimited  Guarantee  GUAR  23
Forbearance  (a)  FORB-A  9
Forbearance  (b)  FORB-B  26
Repeated  Recapitalization  RECAP  9
Centralized  AMCs  AMC  15
Public debt  relief prog-am  PDRP  9
aOut of a total of 40 countries.
As indicated, the most comrmonly  used crisis resolution tools in our  sample of
financial crises were forbearance, liquidity support and unlimited goverunent  guarantees
on bank deposits.  Interestingly, authorities were selective as to which  dimensions to
relax: thus the policy choices alone different dimensions are not strongly correlated (see
Table 1). That means, for example, that governments which used liquidity support did not
necessarily employ any particular other crisis tool.
Table 2: Correlatior matrixfor  individualpolicy measures
LIQSUP  C;UAR  FORB-A  FORB-B  REPCAP  PDRP
LIQSUP  1  0.28  -0.02  0.22  0.1  0.10
GUAR  1  -0.14  0.32  0.46  -0.02
FORB-A  1  0.27  -0.14  0.28
FORB-B  1  0.27  0.27
REPCAP  1  0.00
PDRP  1
12Macroeconomic indicators.  Of course many crises were triggered or exacerbated
by exogenous macroeconomic conditions.  In order to control for the impact of macro-
shocks on the fiscal costs we explored a variety of alternative indicators.  From this larger
set  (see Table  3) the  two  indicators  that  were  consistently  significant were  the  real
interest rate REALINT  and the change in equity prices STOCKPRiCE  (taken to the third power
to increase the contribution of large values).
Table 3: Distribution of macro and micro-indicators before the onset of thefinancial
crisis
Quartile  I  Median  Quartile  HI  Max/Min
Macro indicators
Real deposit interest rates*a  4.2  2.5  0.8
GDP growth*  -1.6  -0.2  0.9  9.3
Change in equity prices*  -27.0  -10.8  20  211
Current account as % GDPt  -5.8  -3.9  -0.6  2.3
Fiscal balance as % GDPt  -4.7  -1.2  0.3  5.1
Cumulative TOT change*  -5.7  -0.6  3.4  21.2
External debt as % GDP*  56.3  14.4  9.2  7.9
Micro indicators
Growth in credit/GDP ratiot  407  214  147  115.7
Loan-to-deposit ratio*  190.5  138.9  111.4  87.6
Bank reserves/deposits  47.3  16.7  8.4  4.4
Government indicators
Share of government in total bank claims  91.3  17.6  11.0  4.0
Bank borrowing from central bank / total bank  80.0  15.9  6.0  2.7
lending
*Average for one year before crisis;
tAverage for two years before crisis;
a Could also be micro indicator.
Indicators  of  the  nature  of  the  bank failures:  We  employ  two  alternative
indicators selecting the more micro-oriented episodes.  MICRO identifies episodes where
micro  deficiencies were  significant; RELMIC  identifies the smaller  number of episodes
where micro deficiencies were the dominant factor. As with all of the other variables, the
definitions  are  elaborated in  the  appendix.  These are  used  as  slope  dummies  with
elements of the policy variables.
IV.3  Regression results
The main results are summarized in Tables 6-8.5  We find that the explanatory
variables employed - mainly the policy variables - can explain between 60 and 80 per
cent  of  the  cross-country  variation  in  fiscal  costs:  an  impressive  testimony  to  the
importance of good intervention and resolution policy.  And the estimated policy impact
is sizable as well as statistically significant.
s Tables 6 and 7 exclude the observations for Argentina (1980) and Egypt: these proved to be large outliers
in all of the regressions where they were included (several are reported in Table 3) -Argentina providing a
large positive residual and Egypt a large negative one. There is particular doubt about the reliability of the
costs data in each of these cases.  Another case, Czech Republic, is excluded from these results because of
some missing data.
13Beginning with the parameter estimates for the macro indicators, it is clear that
macro difficulties, as indicated by high real interest rates and falling equity prices, do
have the predicted effect on total costs of crisis.  (Other macro variables were explored,
as listed in the Appendix, but these were the ones which survive as most significant).
However, the function of including these variables is mainly to ensure that the omission
of macro factors does not bias the estimate of policy variables.
The indicators comprising crisis resolution tools are all measured in such a way
that an increase would be  expected to increase the expected fiscal cost.  The results
reported include all the significant effects that were obtained.  In each case the sign of the
effect is as expected. 6 Varying the specification by including or excluding explanatory
variables does not significantly affect the size of the coefficients.  This applies also to
whether or not the macro variables arz included or not (compare 6.1 with 6.2 or 6.3).
The most consistently significant explanatory variables are LIQSUP and the two
FORBS;  GUAR  is also consistently significant.  Of the regressions in Table  6, 6.2 is  a
parsimonious one almost achieving the lowest SER.  But a lower SER and higher R-bar
squared is achieved by including all of the policy variables as in 6.4 (although here GUAR
and PDRP  are not significant at conventional levels).  Replacing FORB-B  by its product
with  the dummy MICRO achieves a small improvement relative to  6.2, only modestly
supporting the hypothesis that a given degree of regulatory strictness will have higher
fiscal costs where the micro-manageinent environment is bad.
The policy  message  from  Table  6  seems  clear  enough:  open-ended liquidity
support, regulatory forbearance and an unlimited depositor guarantee are all significant
contributors to the fiscal cost of banking crisis.
The role of micro deficiencies is much reinforced by the results of Table 7, which
employs the  alternative measure RELMIC.  While  this  is  a  more  subjective variable,
identifying cases where micro deficiencies were the dominant cause, its use interactively
with  elements of the policy variab'es improves the fit of the equation, without much
affecting the values of the other coefficients.  The lowest SER is in equation 7.6.  This
includes one surprising sign, namely that on the interactive term between  REPCAP  and
RELMIC:  this indicates that repeated capitalizations have less costly consequences in the
episodes that were predominantly driven by micro deficiencies.  Our interpretation of this
finding is that repeated capitalizations were instead more costly in those episodes where
government ownership or intervention was the dominant factor.  The significance of the
variable REPCAP  iS problematic in othier  regressions.
The results of Table 8, incLding  Argentina, 1980 and Egypt, are broadly in line
with those of Table 6 and 7 in terms of significance and size of coefficients, though with
a poorer fit.  We also experimented with alternative functional forms -- several different
6 But note  that  no significant  effect  was found  for the two other  resolution  policies  explored,  namely  a
deposit  freeze  and establishment  of a public  asset  management  company.
14forms give a similar fit without dominating the one shown (though as noted below, the
exact functional form does have implications for the size of out-of-sample predictions).
We need to acknowledge one obvious potential problem of simultaneity here, in
that  really  big  crises  may  have  triggered  adoption  of  policies  such  as  unlimited
guarantees or liquidity support (especially if these policies can be seen to some extent as
being analogous to burying one's head in the sand).  In order to verify that our results are
not  contaminated by  such reverse  causality,  we  employed  an  instrumental  variables
approach.  The  instruments  used  were  those  published  by  ICRG  and  measuring
corruption in the government system (coRRuPT)  and law and order tradition (LA4WORDER)
as well as dummy variables for the dates on which crises began (there are 14 such dates:
each year-dummy takes the value 1 for the countries whose crisis began on that year, zero
otherwise.  This choice of dummies implies that we suppose that these instruments could
be  correlated with  the policies of  liquidity support and unlimited  guarantees,  without
being themselves influenced by the size of the crisis (for example, adoption of policies
might be influenced by date-specific policy "fashions").  As  shown in Table 6A, two-
stage least squares  estimates of the main equations using these  instruments come out
close to  the ordinary least  squares results.  Considering also that  a  regression  of the
residuals on these instruments is not significant, this suggests that reverse causality is not
a problem for the interpretation of our results.
The size effect of  "poor" resolution policies
Our  empirical  findings  reveal  that  unlimited  deposit  guarantees,  open-ended
liquidity support, repeated recapitalizations, debtor bail-outs and regulatory  forbearance
add significantly and sizably to costs. If we were to take the regression results literally
(equation 6.4) and to simulate the effects of "uniformly strict" and "uniformly lax" policy
packages,  we would  obtain rather  extreme results.  Thus equation  6.4 implies  that  a
country which did not have unlimited deposit guarantees, open-ended liquidity support,
repeated  recapitalizations,  debtor  bail-outs  or  regulatory  forbearance,  would  have  a
predicted fiscal cost of only about 1 per cent of GDP;  on the other hand, a country which
adopted the reverse policy in each case would have a predicted fiscal cost in excess of 60
per cent of GDP.  Inasmuch as they are calculated beyond the range of the sample, and
also taking into account their sensitivity to  the functional form of the equation,  these
limiting projections should probably not be taken too literally.  Perhaps more realistic are
the  estimated  impact  of  switching  one  policy  from  strict  to  lax  (holding  all  others
constant at the sample mean value) which, as shown in column B of Table 4, amount to
several percentage points of GDP.
Another caveat worth reiterating is that we have not included variables measuring
pre-intervention preventative policy  in the final regressions.  (As noted before, in  the
initial regressions we employed proxies for the micro-economic environment, but these
did not prove significant; see Appendix).  To the extent that such policy is important (and
to  the extent that  they would be  correlated  with the  included  policy  variables),  their
omission from the equation may have the effect of biasing the estimated coefficients of
the included policy variables.  An accommodating pre-crisis policy which had allowed
15big risks to be taken might well be associated with an accommodating intervention and
resolution policy which allowed the rost-crisis losses to mount.
Table 4: Estimated individual impact ofpolicy variables on  fiscal costs
in  % of GDP
Best  Policy  Estimated saving (% of base case fiscal cost) by
employed  in  switching one policy tool from:
% of cases  strict value  lax value
A  B  C
LIQSUP  0.421  1.6  3.4  -39.0
FORB-A  0.763  1.2  5.6  -34.2
FORB-B  0.158  - 1.1  0.9  -34.0
REPCAP  0.763  1.1  5.2  -33.1
GUAR  0.447  0.6  1.5  -22.4
PDRP  0.789  0.6  3.6  -21.1
Memo:  no policy  switch  (base case  cost)  1.0  6.7  62.6
Columns  A and  B show  the effect  of a policy  relaxation,  switching  the value  of (one  policy  variable  from
strict  to lax)  on the predicted  cost of crisis;  Column  A assumes  all other  variables  held at strict  values;
Coluirm  B sets  the other  policy  dununies  in the  regression  at their sample  mean  (fractional)  values.
Column  C show  the effect  of a policy  tighte ing assuming  all other  variables  left  at their lax values. Thus,
for example,  a policy  of unlimited  liqudity  support  would  increase  average  crisis cost  by 1.6%  of GNP  by
comparison  with  the value  which  would  occur  if all variables  were  held at their strict  values. The estimated
extreme  strict  (A) and  lax (C)  base case  cosis  should  be treated  with  caution,  as they refer  to out  of sample
points  and are sensitive  to functional  form  of the estimated  equation.
Tables  4 and  5 show the estimated  individual  impact  of policy  variables  on fiscal
costs: Table  4 shows  the impact  as a percentage  of GDP, Table  5 as a percentage  of base-
case  fiscal  costs.  The results  illustbate that  among  the  different  policies  tools,  liquidity
support  and  forbearance  measures  seem  to  be the  costliest  measures,  with  the  equation
predicting  that,  if deposit  guarantees,  forbearance  and  repeated  recaps  are employed,  not
extending  liquidity  support  could halve  the expected  fiscal cost.
Table 5: Estimated individaal impact ofpolicy variables on fiscal costs
as °'o  of base case  fiscal  cost
Best  Policy  Estimated saving (% of base case fiscal cost) by
employed in  switching one policy tool from:
% of cases  strict value  lax value
A  B  C
LIQSUP  0.421  165.1  50.8  -62.3
FORB-A  0.763  120.6  82.9  -54.6
FORB-B  0.158  118.6  13.1  -54.3
REPCAP  0.763  112.1  77.5  -52.9
GUAR  0.447  55.7  21.9  -35.8
PDRP  0.789  50.7  38.2  -33.6
Columns A and B show the effect of a policy relaxation, switching the value of (one policy variable from
strict to lax) on the predicted  cost of crisis; Column A assumes all other variables held at strict values;
Colunm  B sets  the  other policy  dunmmies  in  the regression  at  their  sample  mean  (fractional) values.
Column  C show  the effect  of a policy  tightening  assuming  all other  variables  left at their lax values. Thus,
for example, a policy of unlimited liqudity support would increase average crisis cost by 65% of the value
which would occur if all variables were held at their strict values.
16Despite  the  caveats,  the  estimates clearly  indicate  that  substantial  potential
savings are at stake. Their implication is that departures from a strict approach to prompt
intervention through liquidity support of insolvent institutions, forbearance, and repeated
capitalizations have resulted in a sizable increase in the fiscal cost of bankin§ system
failures, as have the use of unlimited guarantees and public debt relief prograrns.
Is there a trade-off between  fiscal costs and economic recovery?
We also explored whether there was any obvious trade-off between fiscal costs
and economic growth recovery.  In other words, might countries that employed costly
policy measures such as liquidity support, unlimited guarantees or forbearance policies
have recovered faster from banking crises and suffered less severe output losses? Using a
standard approach to  measuring output losses - albeit one  which may  overstate  the
contribution of banking crisis to output loss - regression results (Appendix Table A5)
indicate that that does not seem to be the case. Except for liquidity support, all of the
policy variables proved insignificant. And in the case of liquidity support, the positive
coefficient  indicates  that  extension  of  liquidity  support  actually  appeared  to  have
prolonged the crisis as crisis recovery took longer and output loss was bigger.
V.  Conclusion
We  have  made  a  first  attempt  to  quantify  how  effective  intervention  and
resolution policy can be  in lowering the fiscal costs of banking crises.  While much
discussion suggests that the costs of banking crises chiefly represent exogenous shocks,
we find evidence to support the view that these policies do matter.
Of course  it may also be  that the underlying policy philosophy  that  tends to
generate "strict" policy choice is also associated a wider environment which has helped
contain costs in the pre-recognition phase, i.e. before the crisis is recognized as such.  By
the time containment and resolution policies come into play, some of the damage will
have already have been done.
Indeed, although we have emphasized intervention and resolution policy, it is not
really possible to draw an unambiguous line between these and prevention policies.  To
the  extent  that  these  have  been  explicitly  included,  our  estimates  may  somewhat
exaggerate the separate role of intervention and resolution as opposed to prevention.
The data on which we rely are tentative, and one should not rely too heavily on
the precise coefficient estimates.  But the effects we model are nevertheless statistically
significant, have a consistent sign and are economically large.  In particular, open-ended
liquidity support, regulatory forbearance and an  unlimited depositor guarantee are all
7 The manner  in which  estimates  of the cost  of the US S&L crisis  steadily  mounted  from $30  billion  to
$180  billion  as the crisis  unfolded,  a rise often  attributed  to forbearance,  illustrates  the magnitudes  that can
be involved.
17significant contributors to the fiscal cost of banking crisis.  Countries which avoid these
policies can expect to reduce the costs of any future crises by a very considerable amount.
Containment and resolution of banking crises is not an easy matter, and the exact
policy approach cannot be dictaled by the results of a model simplified in order to be
adapted to econometric testing.  We can hardly claim to have proved what the best policy
choice is in all circumstances. Nevertheless, our findings clearly tilt the balance in favor
of a "strict" approach to crisis resalution, rather than an accommodating one.  At the very
least, they emphasize that regulatory  authorities which  choose  an  accommodating or
gradualist approach to an emerging crisis need to be sure that they have some other way
of controlling risk-taking.
18Table 6:  Main regression results
Equation:  6.1  6.2  6.3  6.4  6.5  6.6  6.7  6.8
Variable  Coeff.  t-Statistic Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic Coeff.  t-Statistic Coeff.  t-Statistic Coeff.  t-Statistic Coeff.  t-Statistic
REALINT  0.430  2.77  0.419  2.77  0.367  2.43  0.425  2.84  0.506  3.34  0.433  2.89  0.502  3.40
STOCKPRICE  -0.019  -1.67  -0.020  -1.73  -0.020  -1.72
LIQSUP  0.878  2.70  0.996  3.32  0.867  2.88  0.975  3.37  0.790  2.61  0.967  3.21  0.945  3.22  0.831  2.75
FORB-A  0.513  1.38  0.826  2.32  0.760  2.17  0.791  2.25  0.632  1.77  0.937  2.73  0.864  2.51  0.877  2.62
FORB-B  1.230  2.77  0.994  2.40  1.081  2.66  0.782  1.95  1.006  2.49
REPCAP  0.752  1.99  0.690  1.79
GUAR  0.504  1.55  0.746  2.41  0.817  2.69  0.443  1.30  0.863  2.86  0.917  3.05  0.610  1.78  1.005  3.39
PDRP  0.410  1.17  0.489  1.39  0.456  1.31
FORB-B*MICRO  1.150  2.46  0.886  1.92  1.261  2.75
C  *  3.084  8.38  3.426  9.58  3.409  9.79  4.122  9.25  3.674  9.35  3.535  10.11  4.196  9.61  3.527  10.39
R-squared  0.491  0.589  0.623  0.656  0.646  0.592  0.655  0.627
Adjusted  R-squared  0.429  0.525  0.550  0.575  0.563  0.528  0.574  0.555
S.E. of  regression  0.928  0.847  0.824  0.800  0.812  0.844  0.802  0.819
Sum  squared  resid  28.43  22.94  21.05  19.22  19.78  22.79  19.28  20.80
Log likelihood  48.41  44.33  42.70  40.96  41.52  44.20  -41.03  42.47
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.583  1.867  1.697  1.755  1.510  1.792  1.733  1.700
Mean  dependent  var  1.904  1.904  1.904  1.904-  1.904  1.904  1.904  1.904
S.D.  dependent  var  1.228  1.228  1.228  1.228  1.228  1.228  1.228  1.228
Akaike  info  criterion  2.811  2.649  2.616  2.577  2.606  2.642  2.581  2.604
SchwarzcFiteron  3.026  2.908  2.917  2.922  2.951  2.901  2.925  2.905
F-statistic  7.948  9.171  8.535  8.164  7.807  9.278  8.120  8.699
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Notes: The sample includes 38 episodes, not including Argentina, 1980 and Egypt.
Dependent variable is log(cost).Table  6A: Main regression  results (method:  two-stage  least  squares)
Equation:  6.1A  6.2A  6.3A  6.4A  6.5A
Variable  Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-StaUistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic
REALINT  0.461  2.84  0.459  2.83  0.371  2.36  0.459  2.66
STOCKPRICE  -0.062  -0.27  -0.124  -0.62
LIQSUP  0.907  2.00  1.005  2.63  1.023  2.80  0.983  2.78  0.839  2.20
FORB-A  0.573  1.29  0.882  2.88  0.874  2.88  0.795  2.34  0.716  2.17
FORB-B  1.132  2.62  0.926  1.96  0.932  1.97  0.777  1.57  0.871  1.96
REPCAP  0.742  2.25
GUAR  0.780  2.22  0.923  2.99  0.906  2.88  0.459  1.27  0.988  3.22
PDRP  0.410  1.14  0.565  1.37
C  3.251  5.72  3.539  10.24  3.534  10.11  4.127  10.50  3.809  9.17
R-squared  0.478  0.584  0.587  0.656  0.614
Adjusted  R-squared  0.415  0.520  0.507  0.575  0.523
S.E.  of regression  0.940  0.851  0.862  0.800  0.848
Sum  squared  resid  29.146  23.196  23.037  19.218  21.570
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.596  1.910  1.908  1.758  1.746
Mean  dependent  var  1.904  1.904  1.904  1.904  1.904
S.D.  dependent  var  1.228  1.228  1.228  1.228  1.228
F-siduiu;  .G0G  .955  5  729
Prob(F-statistic)  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Notes:  The samnple  includes 38 episodes, not including Argentina, 1980 and Egypt.
Dependent variable is log(cost);
Method is TSLS; instruments for LIQSUP and GUAR are: CORRUPT, LAWORDER and (14) dummies for the date
on which crises began.
20Table 7: Regression results separately identifying predominantly micro crises
Equation:  7.1  7.2  7.3  7.4  7.5  7.6
Variable  Coeff.  t-Statistic Coeff.  t-Statistic Coeff.  t-Statistic Coeff.  t-Statistic Coeff.  t-Statistic Coeff.  t-Statistic
REALINT  0.441  3.18  0.481  3.38  0.341  2.67  0.449  3.30  0.502  3.65  0.366  2.86
STOCKPRICE  -0.015  -1.48  -0.018  -1.79  -0.012  -1.26
LIQSUP  0.989  3.83  1.029  3.97  1.100  4.95  0.889  3.39  0.921  3.58  1.026  4.50
FORB-A  0.790  2.61  0.753  2.49  0.900  3.44  0.707  2.34  0.642  2.15  0.817  3.05
REPCAP  0.721  2.19  0.678  2.05  1.427  4.02  0.613  1.85  0.534  1.63  1.272  3.42
FORB-B*RELMIC  1.195  2.83  1.082  2.51  1.097  2.98  1.270  3.04  1.139  2.73  1.132  3.09
REPCAP*RELMIC  -1.721  -3.48  -1.574  -3.13
GUAR*RELMIC  0.606  1.90  0.502  1.52  1.018  3.19  0.716  2.22  0.602  1.86  1.038  3.28
PDRP*RELMIC  0.335  1.16  1.116  3.35  0.435  1.53  1.113  3.37
c  3.789  10.01  3.870  10.11  4.320  .12.28  3.678  9.71  3.762  10.04  4.212  11.75
R-squared  0.700  0.713  0.797  0.720  0.741  0.808
Adjusted R-squared  0.641  0.645  0.741  0.655  0.670  0.746
S.E. of regression  0.735  0.731  0.625  0.722  0.706  0.619
Sum squared resid  16.77  16.05  11.32  15.62  14.45  10.71
Log likelihood  -38.38  -37.54  -30.91  -37.03  -35.55  -29.86
Durbin-Watson stat  2.105  2.246  1.593  2.130  2.318  1.622
Mean dependent var  1.904  1.904  1.904  1.904  1.904  1.904
S.D. dependent var  1.228  1.228  1.228  1.228  1.228  1.228
Akaike info criterion  2.388  2.397  2.101  2.370  2.345  2.098
Schwarz criterion  2.690  2.742  2.488  2.715  2.733  2.529
F-statistic  12.03  10.62  14.25  11.03  10.38  13.10
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Notes: The sample  includes  38 episodes,  not including  Argentina,  1980  and Egypt.
Dependent  variable  is log(cost)
21Table 8: Regre.ision  results including two outliers
Equation:  8.1  ,.2  8.3  8.4  8.5
Variable  Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic
REALINT  0.282  1.52  0.201  1.04  0,235  1.20
STOCKPRICE  -0.015  -1.06
LIOSUP  0.679  1.97  0.577  1.66  0.604  1.77  0.707  2.15  0.624  1.85
FORB-A  0.633  1.51  0.461  1.09  0.605  1.43  0.775  2.00  0.694  1.76
FORB-B  1.093  2.16  0.915  1.83  0.809  1.63
REPCAP  1.054  2.52  0.950  2.13  0.756  1.66  1.428  2.74  1.267  2.34
GUAR  0.234  0.61  0.493  1.19
PDRP  0.806  1.96  0.884  2.17
FORB-B*RELMIC  1.268  2.25  1.304  2.31
REPCAP*RELMIC  -1.704  -2.29  -1.553  -2.05
GUAR*RELMIC  1.069  2.18  1.092  2.23
PDRP*RELMIC  1.040  2.03  1.038  2.03
c  3.653  6.90  4.093  7.31  4.221  7.60  4.086  7.75  3.977  7.42
R-squared  0.419  0.483  0.518  0.571  0.587
Adjusted  R-squared  0.353  0.390  0.413  0.461  0.463
S.E.  of  regression  1.052  1.021  1.002  0.960  0.958
Sum  squared  resid  38.72  34.43  32.12  28.57  27.54
Log  likelihood  -56.11  -53.715  -52.37  -50.02  -49.29
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.879  1.760  1.772  1.480  1.551
Mean  dependent  var  1.893  1.893  1.893  1.893  1.893
S.D.  dependent  var  1.307  1.307  1.307  1.307  1.307
Akaike  info  criterion  3.055  3.03E  3.018  2.951  2.964
Schwarz  criterion  3.266  3.334  3.356  3.331  3.387
F-statistic  6.312  5.147  4.915  5.166  4.735
Prob(F-statistic)  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001
Notes:  The sample includes all 40 episode,. including Argentina, 1980 and Egypt.
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25Data Appendix
A.1  Description of Data
A.]. ]  Dependent variable
The dependent variable is ex-post fiscal costs of financial distress as a percentage of
GDP.  Data was obtained for 41 episodes involving 35 countries.  The first date shown
for the crisis is the date at which the existence of the crisis became publicly known.  The
fiscal  cost  figure includes  both  fiscal  and  quasi-fiscal  outlays  for  financial  system
restructuring,  including  the  recapitalization cost  for  banks,  bailout  costs  related to
covering depositors and creditors and debt relief schemes for bank borrowers.
Sourcesforfiscal  cost  andfor  date of crisis: Caprio and Klingebiel (1997), Caprio and
Klingebiel (1999), and Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996); conflicts between different
sources were reconciled with the help of consultations with country experts.
A.1.2  Data on Crisis Resolution Too)ls.
Drawing on the main elements of ac-,epted  best practice for crisis resolution, we classify
each government's approach along the following seven dimensions.
Issuance of a blanket governrnent  guarantee  GUAR
Did  the  government  issue  an  explicit  guarantee?  Were  market  participants
implicitly protected as deposits of state-owned institutions account for more than
75 percent of total banking deposits?
Liquidity support to insolvenj institutions. LIQSUP
Did the government provide substantial liquidity support to insolvent institutions?
(Substantial is  defined as liquidity support surpassing total aggregate financial
system capital).
Deposit Freezes
Did the government freeze leposits  in institutions that were intervened in for a
substantial period of time? (Substantial is defined as a period over 12 months).
Forbearance FOB
Did the government  forbear in  any of the  following progressively less liberal
ways?
Forbearance Type I: banks zre left in open distress, i.e. unable to pay depositors'
rejected at clearing; no access to interbank market; widely believed to insolvent
(except for public banks) for at least a three months period.
Forbearance  Type  II:  banks  were  permitted  to  function  under  existing
management though known to be severely undercapitalized.
Forbearance Type III: regulations (in particular loan classification and loan loss
provisioning) are relaxed or the current regulatory framework is not enforced for
at least a twelve months period to allow banks to recapitalize on a flow basis; or
competition is restricted.
26(In the regressions, FORD1 takes the value 1 if there is any forbearance of type A;
FORB3 takes the value 1 if there is any forbearance of type A, B or C)
Repeated Recapitalizations REPCAP
Did the government recapitalize banks via a one off support scheme or did banks
go through repeated rounds of recapitalizations?
Public Debt Relief Program  PDRP
Did the government implement a broad debt relief program for corporates and/or
other types of borrowers, including through an exchange rate guarantee program
or rescue of corporates?
Public AMCs
Did  the  government  set  up  a  centralized publicly  owned  asset  management
company to which non-performing debt of banks was transferred?
Sources for  crisis resolution  measures:  We  extended the  dataset  from  Caprio and
Klingebiel (1996) in terms of countries and policy variables.  Information on the policy
variables was obtained from official country sources, from the World Bank Regulatory
Database, Garcia (1999) and other IMF reports and interviews with country experts.
These variables are shown in Table Al
A. 1.3  Control Variables
We have assembled data summarizing (i) macroeconomic conditions (ii) indicators of the
regulatory and management environment affecting bank management ("micro factors")
and (iii) the degree of government intrusion.
Macro indicators (average for one or ttwo  years before the crisis date).
- real interest rate (could also be a micro indicator);
- real GDP  growth;
- percentage change of stock market prices;
- fiscal balance as a percentage of GDPt;
- current account as percentage of GDPt;
- short-term external debt as share of GDP and
- percentage change in the terms of trade.
Micro indicators:
- growth in bank credit relative to GDP (as proxy for relaxed credit risk standards)
- real deposit interest rate (possible proxy for financial system distress as banks bid up
rates to stay afloat);
- enforcement of creditor  rights  series (as  proxy of  the  effectiveness of the  legal
system), and
- bank average loan to deposit ratio (as proxy for liquidity risk).
Government intrusion indicators:
27- bank reserves (cash plus with cenlial bank) as percentage of deposits;
- share of govemment in total clainis of banks;
- bank borrowing from central bank as percentage of their total deposits.
Each  continuous  control  variable wras normalized  to  zero  mean  and  unit  standard
deviation.  Quartiles of these variables are shown in Table A2.
Sources for  control variables: Interntational Financial Statistics  - bank  data refers to
deposit money banks;  IFC Emerging  Markets Database;  La Porta  et al.  (1998) (for
enforcement of creditor rights). These were supplemented by national sources.
Al.4  Composite variables
Two alternative dummy variables of ihe importance of micro (bank management) factors
were derived.  Both are shown in Table A3
The first, MICRO takes the value 1 when the country has a high average value of the micro
indicators mentioned above relative to other countries; otherwise zero. 8 Thus, countries
where MiCRO is 1 are measured as having had micro problems.
The second, RELMIC  is a judgmental indicator based on our informed assessment as to
whether micro factors were the priniary factor, i.e. whether they were relatively more
important than macro or government factors in each crisis (Honohan, 2000). In principle,
since any country where MICRO is  1 is measured as having had micro  problems, we
should suppose that RELMIC > MICRO . However, in our data there are some violations of
this reflecting the fact that MICRO  iS data-based and RELMIC  is a subjective/judgmental
variable.  (Both variables were defined before regressions were estimated.)
Two other composite variables were also calculated, one to  summarize macro and the
other government intrusion. However, since these proved insignificant in estimation they
are not further discussed here.
8  Specifically,  each country  was  scored  0,1,2 or 3 for each  of the micro  variables  corresponding  to the
quartile  score;  the mean  for each  country  of these  quantized  scores  was  then computed  and  MICRO  set to 1
for countries  at or higher  than  the median  across  countries.
28Table  Al:  Intervention/Resolution Policy Tools
Guaranee  Liqidity  upport  Deposit  Forbearance  Repeated  Public  Public Debt
Fiscal Cost  Guarantee  Liquiditysupport  Freezes  Recaps  AMC  Relief
Cour  of G  Explicit  to DMB  to NBFIs  A  B  C  Program
state-owned
I Argentina  1980-  1982  55.1  no  yes  no  no  no  no  yes  no  no  yes
2 Argentina  1995  0.5  no  no  no  no  yes  no  no  no  no  no  no
3 Australia  1989-1992  1.9  no  no  no  no  no  no  yes  no  no  no  no
4 Brazil  1994-  1996  13.2  no  no  no  no  no  yes  no  yes  no  no  yes
5 Bulgaria  1996 -1997  13.0  no  yes  yes  . no  yes  yes  yes  no  no  no
6 Chile  1981 - 1983  41.2  no  no  yes  no  yes  no  no  yes  no  no  yes
7 Colombia  1982-  1987  5.0  no  yes  yes  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no
8 Cote d'lvore  1988 - 1991  25.0  no  no  yes  . no  yes  yes  yes  no  yes  no
9 Czech Republic  1989 - 91  12.0  yes  yes  no  no  yes  no  no  yes  yes  yes  no
10 Ecuador  1996- ongoing  13.0  no  no  no  no  no  yes  yes  no  no  no  yes
11 Egypt  1991-1995  0.5  yes  no  no  yes  yes  no  yes  yes  no  yes  no
12 Finland  1991-1994  11.0  yes  no  yes  . no  no  yes  no  no  yes  no
13 France  1994-95  0.7  no  no  no  no  no  no  yes  no  no  yes  no
14 Ghana  1982 - 1989  3.0  no  yes  yes  . no  yes  yes  yes  no  no  yes
15 Hungary  1991 - 1995  10.0  no  yes  yes  . yes  no  no  yes  yes  no  no
16 Indonesia  1992-  1994  3.8  no  no  no  no  no  no  yes  yes  no  no  no
17 Indonesia  1997-  ongoing  50.0  yes  yes  yes  no  no  no  yes  yes  yes  yes  no
18 Japan  1992- ongoing  20.0  yes  no  yes  . no  no  yes  yes  yes  no  no
19 Malaysia  1985 - 88  4.7  no  no  . yes  no  no  yes  no  no  no  no
21 Malaysia  1997-ongoing  16.4  yes  no  no  no  yes  no  yes  yes  yes  yes  no
22 Mexico  1994 - ongoing  19.3  yes  no  yes  no  no  no  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
23 New Zealand  1987-90  1.0  no  no  yes  . no  no  no  no  no  no  no
24 Norway  1987-93  8.0  yes  no  yes  . no  no  yes  no  no  no  no
25 Paraguay  1995 - ongoing  5.1  yes  no  yes  yes  no  no  yes  yes  no  no  no
26 Philippines  1983-  1987  13.2  no  no  yes  . yes  yes  yes  yes  no  yes  yes
27 Philippines  1998-  ongoing  0.5  no  no  no  . yes  no  no  no  no  no  no
28 Poland  1992-95  3.5  no  yes  yes  . no  no  yes  yes  no  no  no
29 Senegal  1988 - 1991  9.6  no  yes  yes  . no  no  yes  yes  no  yes  yes
30 Slovenia  1992- 1994  14.6  yes  yes  no  no  yes  yes  no  yes  no  yes  no
29CiGuarantee  Liquidity support  Depos  Forbearance  Repeated  Public  Public Debt
Country  Period  Fiscal Cost  uanteLqdtys~O  Freezes  orec  Recaps  AMC  Relief
Explicit  to DMB  to NBFIs  A  B  C  Program
state-owned
31 South Korea  1997 - ongoing  26.5  yes  no  yes  yes  no  yes  no  yes  yes  yes  no
32 Spain  1977-85  5.6  no  no  yes  . no  no  yes  no  no  no  no
33 SriLanka  1989-93  5.0  yes  yes  no  no  no  no  yes  no  yes  yes  no
34 Sweden  1991-94  4.0  yes  no  no.  no  yes  no  no  no  no  yes  no
35 Thailand  1983-  87  2.0  no  no  no  no  no  no  yes  yes  no  no  no
36 Thailand  1997-  ongoing  32.8  yes  no  no  yes  yes  no  yes  yes  no  no  no
37 Turkey  1982  -85  2.5  no  no  no  no  yes  no  no  no  no  no  no
38 Turkey  1994  1.1  yes  . no  no  yes  no  no  yes  no  no  no
39 United States  1981-91  3.2  no  no  no  no  yes  yes  yes  yes  no  no  no
40 Uruguay  1981  - 84  31.2  no  yes  yes  yes  no  no  no  yes  yes  yes  yes
41 Venezuela  1994-97  22.0  no  no  yes  no  no  yes  yes  no  no  no
30Table A2:  Micro Indicators and Composites
Growth in  Real deposit  Loan  Enforcement  Loan to  Micro Index  MICRO  RELMIC
Countries  Period  credit/ GDP  interest rate  classificationa  of creditor  deposit ratio  Average  0 if average  "primarily
(I)  (II)  (III)  rights' (IV)  (V)  I-V  >.2.4  micro"c
I Argentina  1980-  1982  3  1  2  2  3  2.2  1  1
2 Argentina  1995  1  2  3  4  2  2.4  0  0
3 Australia  1989-1992  3  3  3  4  2  3.0  0  0
4 Brazil  1994-  1996  2  . 3  3  2  2.0  1  1
5 Bulgaria  1996 -1997  4  1  3  . 4  2.4  0  1
6 Chile  1981 - 1983  1  3  3  4  1  2.4  0  0
7 Colombia  1982-  1987  3  2  2  1  3  2.2  1  1
8 Coted'lvore  1988 - 1991  4  1  1  2  1  1.8  1  1
9 Czech Republic  1989 - 91  2  3  1  3  . 2.8  1  1
10 Ecuador  1996 - ongoing  1  4  3  2  3  2.6  0  0
11 Egypt  1991 - 1995  4  1  . 1  4  2.0  1  1
12 Finland  1991-1994  3  2  4  4  1  2.8  0  0
13 France  1994-95  4  2  4  4  1  3.0  0  0
14 Ghana  1982 - 1989  4  1  1  1  4  2.2  1  1
15 Hungary  1991 - 1995  4  2  1  3  1  2.2  1  0
16 Indonesia  1992-  1994  1  4  1  1  2  1.8  1  0
17 Indonesia  1997-ongoing  3  4  2  3  2  2.8  0  1
18 Japan  1992 - ongoing  2  2  4  3  2  2.6  0  0
19 Malaysia  1985 - 88  1  4  2  3  2  2.4  0  0
20 Malaysia  1997 - ongoing  2  3  2  3  2  2.4  0  0
21 Mexico  1994-ongoing  1  4  2  2  1  2.0  1  1
22 New Zealand  1987-90  2  2  4  2  4  2.8  0  0
23 Norway  1987-93  1  4  1  4  2  2.4  0  0
24 Paraguay  1995 - ongoing  2  3  3  4  3  3.0  0  0
25 Philippines  1983 - 1987  3  3  2  1  1  2.0  1  1
26 Philippines  1998 - ongoing  1  3  3  2  3  2.4  0  0
27 Poland  1992-95  2  1  1  2  4  2.0  1  1
28 Senegal  1988 - 1991  4  4  1  1  1  2.2  1  1
29 Slovenia  1992 - 1994  . 4  1  4  3  2.4  0  0Growth in  Real deposit  Loan  Enforcement  Loan to  Micro Index  MICRO  RELMIC
Countries  Period  credit/ GDP  interest rate  classification'  of creditor  deposit ratio  Average  0 if average  primarily
(I)  (II)  (III)  rightsb (IV)  (V)  I-V  >.2.4  micro''C
30 South Korea  1997-  ongoing  2  3  2  2  1  2.0  1  0
31 Spain  1977-85  3  1  1  2  4  2.2  1  0
32 Sri Lanka  1989-93  1  2  1  3  1.4  1  1
33 Sweden  1991-94  1  2  3  4  1  2.2  1  0
34 Thailand  1983 - 87  2  3  1  1  3  2.0  1  0
35 Thailand  1997-  ongoing  3  4  1  2  1  2.2  1  0
36 Turkey  1982 - 85  3  1  1  4  4  2.6  0  1
37 Turkey  1994  4  1  3  4  4  3.2  0  1
38 United States  1981-91  2  3  4  4  2  3.0  0  0
39 Uruguay  1981 - 84  3  1  . 2  3  1.8  1  1
40 Venezuela  1994-97  4  4  2  1  4  3.0  0  0
a'Thresholds  set as follows: Provisioning required at 360 days overdue; do. at 120 days overdue; forward-looking criteria.
DalbCU  Ull  14  ia1L4CL  41.  aL7Y7OJ,  'Ms1.o  s  s  .--
cSee  text.
32A.1.2  Data  on output loss and length of crisis
To explore whether there is a tradeoff between fiscal costs and economic recovery we ran
regression  using  an  IMF  estimate  of  output  loss  and  recovery  time  as  dependent
variables.
Output  loss.  We use the approach of and data from the IMF World Economic Outlook
(1998) and update it for the more recent crises. This approach calculates output loss as
the extent to which country's  GDP growth deviated from trend GDP growth that the
country had exhibited before the crisis.
Recovery  time:  According to the IMF methodology this is defined as 1 plus the number
of years that real GDP growth rates are below trend growth rates.
The regression results (shown in Table A5) indicate little impact of the policy variables
on these measures. Only the liquidity support variable is significant at the 5 per cent
level.
Table A3: Distribution  of output loss, recovery  time  and crisis  length
Output  loss  Recovery  time
In percent  of GDP  In years
Mean  12.5  3.5
Median  8.4  3.0
Max  45.6  9.0
Min  0  [.0
33Table A4: Estimated length of crisis, gross output loss and recovery time
Country  Recovery timne  Recovery time in  Gross output loss
years  In percent of GDP
Argentina  1980-82  4  16.6
Argentina  1995-96  3  11.9
Australia  1989  1  0
Brazil  1994  0  1
Bulgaria  1996-97  3  20.4
Chile  1981-88  9  45.5
Colombia  1982-85  5  65.1
Czech  Republic  1989  1  0
Ecuador  1996  1  0.9
Egypt  1991-94  5  6.5
Finland  1991-96  7  23.1
France  1994  1  0
Ghana  1982  2  6.6
Hungary  1991-92  3  13.8
Indonesia  1992-present  9  42.3
Indonesia  1997-present  4  33.0
Japan  1992-present  9  27.7
Malaysia  1985-87  4  13.7
Malaysia  1997-prescnt  4  22.8
Mexico  1994  2  9.6
New  Zealand  1987-92  7  18.5
Norway  1987-93  8  19.6
Paraguay  1995  1  0
Philippines  1983-86  5  25.7
Philippines  1998-present  3  7.5
Poland  1992  1  0
Senegal  1988  1  0
Slovenia  1992  2  2.1
South  Korea  1997-98  3  16.5
Spain  1977  1  0
Sri Lanka  1989-9(1  3  0.5
Sweden  1991-92  3  6.5
Thailand  1983  2  8.7
Thailand  1997-present  4  31.5
Turkey  1982  1  0
Turkey  1994  2  9.1
United  States  1981-82  3  5.4
Urugay  1981-8:5  6  41.7
Venezuela  1994-915  4  14.1
34Table A5:  Regression results for GDP growth rate losses & recovery time
Growth  loss  Growth  loss  Growth  loss  Growth  loss  Recovery  time
Regression:  A5.1  A5.2  A5.3  A5.4  A5.4
Variable  Coeff. t-Statistic  Coeff. z-statistic  Coeff. t-Statistic  Coeff.  z-Statistic  Coeff.  z-Statistic
REALINT  0.024  1.018  0.487  1.060  0.011  0.400  0.371  0.733  -0.824  -1.44
STOCKPRICE  0.003  0.117  0.470  1.275  0.015  0.600  0.817  1.615  0.041  0.09
LIQSUP  0.090  2.005  1.956  -2.270  0.111  2.442  2.429  2.381  2.000  2.25
FORB-A  -0.048  -0.885  -0.744  -0.691  -0.014  -0.267  0.101  0.090  -2.315  -1.70
FORB-B  0.006  0.094  0.151  0.128  0.188  0.16
REPCAP  0.059  1.000  1.636  1.406  0.122  1.690  2.412  1.615  -0.539  -0.48
GUAR  -0.016  -0.291  -0.334  -0.333  0.165  0.15
PDRP  0.058  1.075  0.372  0.348  0.944  0.83
FORB-B*RELMIC  -0.019  -0.253  -1.064  -0.714  1.180  0.80
REPCAP*RELMIC  -0.119  -1.180  0.425  0.185
GUAR*RELMIC  -0.002  -0.024  -0.489  -0.412
PDRP*RELMIC  0.068  0.974  -1.382  -0.686
c  0.211  2.960  1.700  1.211  0.231  3.206  2.313  1.353
R-squared(McFadden)  0.247  0.231  0.262  0.267  0.280
Adjusted  R-squared  0.054  0.040
S.E. of  regression  0.128  0.482  0.129  0.473  0.451
Sum  squared  resid  0.510  7.204  0.500  6.713  6.306
Log  likelihood  30.50  -21.32  30.86  -20.31  -19.35
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.958  1.821
Mean  dependent  var  0.125  0.500  0.125  0.500  0.400
S.D.  dependent  var  0.132  0.506  0.132  0.506  0.496
Akaikeinfocriteron  -1.075  1.516  -1.044  1.516  1.418
Schwarz  criterion  -0.696  1.900  -0.622  1.934  1.798
F-statistic  1.276  1.182
Prob(F-statistic)  0.292  0.342
LR-statistic  12.81  14.82
Prob(LR-statisbc)  0.118  0.096
Method  OLS  Logit  OLS  Logit  Logit
Notes:  The sanmple  includes all episodes (i.e. n  40).
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